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NO. 38 OCTOBER 2019 Introduction 
Turkey’s Nuclear Onset 
Military Policy, Techno-Nationalism Trends and Defence Industrial Capabilities 
Can Kasapoğlu 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has recently stated that there is no reason why Tur-
key should not have nuclear warhead-tipped missiles, at a time when other nations 
also possess such a deterrent. The Turkish president’s remarks sparked heated 
debates as to Ankara’s possible military policy shifts and related nuclear objectives. 
In the 2010s, Turkey accomplished a number of outstanding achievements in the 
defence sector, especially in unmanned systems development. Ankara is also pursuing 
a ballistic missile programme (the Bora missile) which saw its operational debut back 
in May 2019. However, in the short term, the Turkish defence technological and in-
dustrial base (DTIB) lacks the capacity to support military-grade nuclear proliferation, 
nuclear warhead design and strategic ballistic missile production. More importantly, 
present indicators suggest no backtrack from Turkey’s non-proliferation commit-
ments. Rather, the ‘nuclear missile’ rhetoric essentially highlights Ankara’s geo-
political worldview. 
 
One cannot grasp the importance of stra-
tegic weapons for regional powers without 
developing a good understanding of the 
intra-war deterrence concept, namely, the 
ability to control the trajectory of an armed 
conflict. Andrew Terrill’s 2009 US Army 
War College monograph defines intra-war 
deterrence as the “process of explicit and 
tacit bargaining within an ongoing war” to 
control the escalatory patterns. Thus, the 
concept is centred on drawing deterrent red 
lines around the mode of warfighting by 
signalling dire consequences to the adver-
sary, in case it crosses certain thresholds. 
The essential instruments of maintaining 
intra-war deterrence are strategic weapon 
systems, namely, weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) along with ballistic missiles as 
the most convenient means of delivery. 
On a separate note, as techno-scientific 
developments enable new capabilities over 
time, one could consider additional 
arms (i.e. AI-empowered offensive cyber agents), 
to be strategic weapons, should these arms 
become capable of inflicting catastrophic 
damage. Some of the literature also in-
cludes a secondary segment entitled 
‘defensive strategic weapons’. Long-range 
air and missile defence systems fall under 
this category. 
Although it traditionally fields a robust 
conventional warfighting force, Turkey 
faces significant shortfalls in its strategic 
weapon systems and intra-war deterrence 
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capacity which hinder Ankara’s geopolitical 
ambitions. 
To address the shortcomings, Turkey is 
pursuing several projects, including a co-
operation with EUROSAM to jointly pro-
duce a long-range air and missile defence 
system, the S-400 deal and efforts to devel-
op deep-strike capabilities. Yet, none of the 
current programmes suggest a military-
nuclear agenda. 
No easy way out in the 
military-nuclear sphere 
A non-nuclear state, which plans to devel-
op military-grade nuclear capability, must 
meet several conditions, unless it plans 
to procure off-the-shelf nuclear weapons 
(there has long been speculation that this 
scenario may apply to Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan). Firstly, in a hypothetical case, 
the aspirant non-nuclear state builds a tech-
no-scientific base. It subsequently acquires 
weapons-grade fissile material (either Ura-
nium or Plutonium based). Then, it devel-
ops a simple nuclear device. Yet, obtaining 
a nuclear device would not guarantee 
having a nuclear warhead suitable for bal-
listic missiles, which is the best solution 
for WMD delivery. Designing, and more im-
portantly, miniaturising a nuclear warhead 
is a daunting task. 
In terms of furtiveness, a nuclear weap-
ons programme is a far cry from chemical 
and especially biological warfare pro-
grammes. Biological weapons proliferation 
can easily be hidden away under the guise 
of zoonotic, marine biology, microbiology, 
vaccinology, or genetic engineering 
research. However, building military-grade 
nuclear capacity cannot go under the radar 
so easily. 
Turkey’s ballistic missile 
programme remains solely 
conventional 
A closer look at Turkey’s ballistic missile 
programme gives a hint as to Ankara’s most 
probable motives with regard to its nuclear 
rhetoric. 
The Bora line forms the core of Turkey’s 
missile programme. The line can be traced 
back to Ankara’s initial defence coopera-
tion with Beijing in the late 1990s. Based on 
the Chinese B-611 tactical ballistic missile 
as a baseline, Turkey has made significant 
progress, especially in developing the mis-
sile’s accuracy. Bora is a road-mobile missile 
that carries a 480 kg high-explosive war-
head, has an operational range of around 
280 km and is reported to have a CEP (cir-
cular error probable) of 50 metres. Notably, 
ROKETSAN, the primary manufacturer of 
the weapon system, claims Bora’s CEP is as 
small as 10 metres or even less. If true, this 
would make the missile one of the most 
precise in its class. 
Bora saw its combat debut in May 2019 
during Operation Claw in Northern Iraq. Its 
maiden operational launch was widely 
publicised in the Turkish press, showcasing 
yet another milestone for Turkey’s burgeon-
ing defence industries. After all, a road-
mobile (enables better survivability on the 
battleground), solid-fuel (minimises the 
launch-cycle, supporting launch at short 
notice) tactical ballistic missile, carrying 
half a ton of high-explosive warhead with 
precision strike capability within 280 kilo-
metres represents a game-changer for 
Turkish military operations. Now, Ankara 
must walk a fine line in missile prolifera-
tion, as Turkey is a party to the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR, a non-
binding yet effective exports control regime 
focusing on systems able to deliver at least 
500 kg payload to 300 km and beyond). 
The Bora line’s further roadmap remains a 
critical issue. In this matter, only limited 
open-source input is available. In 2018, the 
Turkish defence minister spoke of a second 
batch, Bora 2, without detailing the admin-
istration’s plans for areas of improvement. 
Notably, back in 2012, the Turkish press 
reported that then Prime Minister Erdoğan 
had set the bar high for the country’s 
national research and development efforts 
and had called on the industry to produce 
missiles with a range of around 2,500 km, 
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probably with the Middle Eastern military 
strategic balance in mind. 
Technically, unless Ankara opts for 
adding another stage to Bora, which would 
mark a burdensome difficulty in terms of 
know-how and defence economics, it would 
be safe to assume that the Bora family will 
remain a short-range system (meaning an 
operational range of less than 1,000 km). 
In comparison, Iran’s Sejjil 2 solid-fuel bal-
listic missile, for example, has a two-stage 
design (independent rocket stages with 
engine and propellant), setting its opera-
tional range at around 2,000 km which 
places it in the medium-range ballistic 
missile category (operational range between 
1,000 km and 3,000 km). An educated guess 
suggests that Turkey would focus on mini-
mising the launch-cycle and boosting their 
precision and manoeuvrability (new gen-
eration ballistic missiles, such as the Rus-
sian SS-26 Iskander, can follow unpredicta-
ble trajectories and homing manoeuvres to 
strengthen missile defences). Another area 
of improvement might be to reduce the 
radar cross-section of Bora by altering its 
design to prevent it being easily detected 
by early warning systems. Although such 
modernisation packages might furnish the 
Turkish Armed Forces with an even more 
lethal battlefield asset, it would not hint at 
a programme to produce delivery means for 
nuclear payloads, as there is no visible work 
on nuclear warhead design, no hint that 
the Bora line will be adjusted for WMD 
delivery and, so far, no effort to develop an 
airburst mode warhead detonation during 
the tests (airburst above ground level is pre-
ferred in ballistic missiles used in WMD 
dissemination). 
In fact, considering the anti-access/area 
denial (A2/AD) zones surrounding Turkey, 
which pose an immense threat to manned 
aircraft, Ankara’s decision to invest in high-
precision ballistic missile capabilities for 
conventional roles, coupled with unmanned 
aerial platforms with higher payloads, 
makes perfect sense. 
The F-35 and S-400: a wildcard? 
The F-35 and the S-400 remain mutually 
exclusive defence procurements for Ankara 
for political and military-technical reasons. 
Interestingly, this conundrum might have 
an indirect effect on Turkey’s role in NATO’s 
tactical nuclear posture, and relatedly, the 
Turkish administration’s strategic push for 
nuclear capabilities. Available literature 
shows that while the Turkish Air Force had 
nuclear certified platforms during the Cold 
War within the NATO framework, its pres-
ent doctrinal order of battle does not 
feature such a role. 
Nevertheless, open-source data suggests 
that Turkey still hosts some 60 to 70 B-61 
tactical nuclear bombs which are awaiting 
modernisation under the B-61 Life Exten-
sion Program. The US does not field a per-
manent, nuclear certified air-wing on Turk-
ish soil. Should a tactical nuclear weapons 
(TNW) mission arise, a nuclear-certified 
strike package would be deployed in Tur-
key. In this case, although the Turkish 
military does not have nuclear-certified 
platforms anymore, Turkey would still be 
expected to conduct support roles, such as 
providing fighter escort or flying tanker 
aircraft for aerial refuelling. Any scenario 
involving the forward-deployed TNW 
arsenal in Turkey would initiate classified 
Nuclear Command, Control and Communi-
cations (NC3) protocols. 
Executing the tasks mentioned above 
would prove difficult if the engagement 
envelopes of the standalone S-400 systems 
cover Turkish airspace. Moreover, amidst 
strained US-Turkish bilateral relations, 
some Western experts have penned pieces 
advocating the removal of TNWs from 
Turkey. Any unilateral decision by the US 
to withdraw the B-61s from Turkey could 
damage relations with the Turkish political-
military elite. As Elaine Bunn’s famous 
analogy goes, these assets are like ‘wedding 
rings’; while not wearing them from the 
outset might be acceptable, taking them off 
after a while would be a different story. 
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The real meaning of ‘nuclear 
missiles’ rhetoric 
In the short term, Turkey’s DTIB lacks the 
capacity to produce a two-stage, medium-
range ballistic missile, which would be a 
meaningful asset for building a nuclear 
deterrent with real regional impact, and 
arm it with an advanced, miniaturised 
nuclear warhead. Besides, any serious vio-
lations of the non-proliferation regimes, to 
which Turkey has committed itself, might 
lead to devastating economic repercussions 
and possibly the collapse of Turkey’s peace-
ful nuclear energy plans, labelling it an 
unacceptable risk. So, if Ankara’s defence 
policy were not to prioritise nuclear warfare 
in the coming years, what does the Presi-
dent’s statement mean? 
In broad terms, the speech reflects the 
upturn in defence sector-driven techno-
nationalism in Turkey. Notably, in the very 
same text, President Erdoğan praised Tur-
key’s success with the indigenous T-129 
attack helicopter and also touched on the 
example of the decline of the Czech defence 
industry as a result of ‘naïve’ paralogies, 
probably referring to the Vaclav Havel 
administration’s policies during the post-
Cold War period. 
Secondly, the discourse reflects the Turk-
ish administration’s uneasy stance on the 
global security architecture. Only minutes 
after the ‘nuclear missiles’ statement, Presi-
dent Erdoğan reacted harshly to US criti-
cism of Turkey’s procurement of the S-400. 
In his UN General Assembly address in Sep-
tember 2019, President Erdoğan said that 
nuclear weapons should be banned com-
pletely or be freely available to all states. 
Ankara’s geopolitical worldview is seeking 
more room to manoeuvre on the interna-
tional stage and nuclear issues offer a lucra-
tive opportunity for political signalling on 
this matter. 
Turkey’s roadmap for defence moderni-
sation is expected to remain on track and 
pursue further progress on items that have 
been in the limelight, such as unmanned 
systems, blue-water naval capabilities, stra-
tegic air and missile defence and smart con-
ventional weaponry across the spectrum. 
Tactical aviation and Turkey’s upgrade to 
fifth-generation systems looms large as 
the biggest unknown, revolving around the 
F-35 issue, Russia’s charm offensives and 
the national combat aircraft project (Milli 
Muharip Uçak – MMU). The ballistic missile 
programme will likely be limited to the 
short range (< 1,000 km) in the foreseeable 
future, focusing on producing tactical assets 
for battlefield use. Turkey can further ad-
vance its GEZGIN cruise missile project and 
reach a range of beyond 1,000 km. How-
ever, the GEZGIN project is designed to de-
velop conventional long-range strike capa-
bilities for naval platforms, mimicking the 
US Tomahawk and Russian Kalibr missiles. 
Of course, there are certain wildcards 
that may turn the tables. Emergence of an 
irreversible decline in Turkey’s transatlantic 
security guarantees, or a nuclear arms race 
coming to the fore in the Middle East could 
upset Ankara’s defence planning calcula-
tions. 
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